In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules. Examples of "costly rule bending" considered here include hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before making one's own.
Introduction
Breaking or bending rules is not uncommon in auctions or negotiations. This paper shows that costly rule-breaking hurts the seller ex ante even if it benefits the seller ex post. Indeed, the seller bears all costs associated with rule-breaking in equilibrium, no matter whether it is the seller or the buyers who cheat. Thus, the seller is willing to pay an intermediary ("auctioneer") to credibly commit to a sales mechanism in which no one -including the seller -has the ability and incentive to break the rules.
The recent high-profile sale of the General Motors Building in Manhattan provides an example of alleged seller misbehavior. The owners of the building advertised that they would sell it using a first-price sealed-bid auction.
1 According to the New York Times, this auction "drew the highest bids ever for a skyscraper in the United States", up to $1.4 billion.
However, the owners allegedly revealed others' bids to one of the bidders and allowed that bidder to submit a late, winning offer. (The bidder who had submitted the highest bid in the auction round unsuccessfully sued to block the deal.)
The Netherlands 3G auction provides a recent example of alleged buyer misbehavior.
The bidder Telfort allegedly induced another bidder Versatel to stop bidding by threatening to sue Versatel for driving up the price by its participation in the auction; see Klemperer (2002) for details. More broadly, Klemperer argues that "Ascending auctions are particularly vulnerable to rule-breaking by the bidders since they necessarily pass through a stage where there is just one (or a few) excess bidders". During this final stage of the auction, each bidder has a strong incentive to drive others from active bidding. Such anti-competitive behavior is clearly harmful to the seller.
Less obvious is whether a seller, or an auctioneer acting on the seller's behalf, would prefer to stop buyers from making more offers than allowed by the auction rules. As Klemperer For example, excuses for not accepting a winning bid can often be found if losing bidders are willing to bid higher. The famous RJR-Nabisco sale went through several supposedly final sealed-bid auctions (Burrough and Helyar, 1990 )". It may seem good for the seller to be able to solicit additional rounds of offers, but McAdams and Schwarz (2006) show that the seller is worse off when unable to commit to a single round of offers. The reason is that buyers anticipate that they will have another chance in the future to make a serious bid, and hence bid less aggressively than if there were a single round.
Fraudulent bidding by the seller or her accomplices ("shill bidding") is another sort of rule-breaking by sellers. eBay threatens shill bidders with a variety of internal and external punishments, such as loss of "eBay Powerseller" status and reporting to law enforcement.
In November 2004, Eliot Spitzer successfully prosecuted several cases arising from an investigation of shill bidding in online auctions.
2 Despite the risks, a seller may find it difficult to commit not to hire a shill if she interacts infrequently with buyers and/or if buyers find it difficult to detect shills.
The possibility of cheating in negotiations can have implications for industry structure.
An upstream firm whose negotiations with suppliers are prone to costly cheating will earn less profit and have a greater incentive to merge with its suppliers than otherwise. Indeed, by eliminating the efficiency losses due to cheating, such a merger can constitute a Pareto improvement. Thus, this paper provides a new sort of efficiency rationale for vertical integration. Indeed, the efficiency losses due to cheating in negotiations between unintegrated firms can be substantial, in some cases as large as the extra revenue associated with committing to an optimal reserve price in an auction. In this sense, our paper relates to the growing 2 "Shill bidding' exposed in online auctions", Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, November 8, 2004. literature on the interaction between negotiation institutions and the incentives for vertical integration. See e.g. Hart and Tirole (1990) , Chemla (2003) , Inderst and Wey (2003) , and de Fontenay and Gans (2005).
When mergers are not possible, cheating creates an opportunity for an auctioneer to arise to help conduct an orderly sales process. Since buyers and sellers may need to interact in the future with the auctioneer, even if they never expect to trade with each other again, the auctioneer may be in a better position to sanction opportunistic behavior as well as to tie its own hands. Since an auctioneer can be involved in many more transactions than any individual buyer or seller, it may also enjoy economies of scale in preventing, detecting, and punishing opportunistic behavior by the other players (as well as in marketing, conducting sales, and so on). 42.8% of all internet fraud complaints were of e-auction fraud, and about 7,200 e-auction fraud complaints were referred to law enforcement.) Separately, an analysis of rare coin auctions on eBay indicated that about 5% of all such auctions have at least one buyer who acts as if to "run up the bid" rather than to win the auction (Kauffman and Wood (2000) ).
4 McLaughlin (1990) reports average investment banking fees of 1.29%.
and negotiation skills as well as their ability to verify quality and create a marketplace.
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This paper argues that reputable auctioneers may also create value by enforcing the rules of a sales mechanism and by creating a marketplace in which neither buyers nor sellers have the incentive to behave opportunistically.
The idea of using third-parties to commit to a negotiation strategy was noted by Schelling (1956) and has been explored in the extensive literature on commitment through delegation.
Delegation in this literature allows the seller to strengthen her bargaining position by incentivizing the delegate to be a tough bargainer. For example, a seller may benefit by sending a representative who can commit to a reserve price (Bester (1994) ), who has a different utility function than the seller (Crawford and Varian (1979) and Sobel (1981) Burguet and Perry (1999) , Che (2004), Ingraham (2005) , Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004) and Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2002) . We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the connection with the corruption literature.
the slogan for uBid.com, a relatively recent entrant in the online auctioneering market, is "The marketplace you can trust" (emphasis in original).
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Our work also complements the existing literature on auction theory and mechanism design. Relative to the benchmark performance of a standard efficient auction, 8 this literature shows how much extra expected revenue a seller can raise given complete commitment power. See e.g. Myerson (1981) . Our work shows how a seller who lacks the power to credibly commit to hard rules may achieve significantly less than this benchmark.
There is a vast literature on bargaining with private information in the context of a single seller and a single buyer. 9 In such settings, typically, the seller is worse off and the buyer is better off when the seller lacks the power to commit to a negotiation strategy. See e.g. Bulow (1982) . By contrast, in our model the seller's inability to commit to rules hurts the seller but buyers are neither better nor worse off. The reason is that each buyer's expected surplus is determined by his "information rent", which does not depend on how much players spend to break the rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main result on the revenue effects of cheating, with applications to "spying" in Section 2.1 and to "shill bidding" 
Who bears the cost of broken commitments?
A (female) risk-neutral seller has one object to sell to N ≥ 2 risk-neutral (male) buyers who have i.i.d. private values drawn from interval support in [0, ∞) and density f (·). The seller announces a procedure to sell the object, but the seller and/or the buyers have the ability to violate that procedure ("cheat") at some cost.
For example, a seller holding a "second-price auction" or an "English auction" could employ shill bidders. Or a seller holding a "first-price auction" could reveal the sealed bids and delay the sale in hopes of negotiating an even higher price. Employing shill bidders, lying to buyers, credibly revealing sealed bids, and delay may all be costly to the seller. Even so, if buyers are naive and do not anticipate such behavior, the seller may gain by her ability to cheat them. If buyers are sophisticated, however, they will compete less aggressively in anticipation that the seller may cheat.
In other contexts it may be the buyers who incur costs as they try to gain an unfair advantage. For instance, in a first-price auction, a bidder who learns that he has not won might try to improve his offer after the fact. It may be difficult for the seller to commit to refuse such revised offers, or otherwise stop the buyers from cheating in ways that increase the price. Our analysis also applies to sales that are conducted by a corruptible auctioneer since, from the buyers' point of view, bribing the auctioneer is just another cheating cost.
Thus, an auction with a corrupt auctioneer can be viewed as an auction with costly buyer cheating.
In the larger game played by a possibly cheating seller and possibly cheating buyers, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium induces an incentive-compatible mechanism. For each buyer i, 
Theorem 1 shows that, holding the allocation probabilities p(·) fixed, the seller is always better off using a mechanism with hard rules, in which neither she nor the buyers have the ability and incentive to cheat. Indeed, again holding p(·) fixed, (1) implies that the seller pays for all cheating costs, including those incurred by the buyers. 10 As cheating changes the way that the object is allocated, however, it is conceivable that the seller might prefer to allow cheating rather than commit to a non-optimal auction with hard rules. On the other hand, every incentive-compatible mechanism with costly cheating leads to strictly lower expected revenue for the seller than an optimal auction.
The following remarks are straightforward corollaries of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. In any incentive-compatible mechanism, the seller's expected revenue is less than or equal to the seller's expected revenue in an optimal auction minus the sum of all cheating costs incurred by all players.
10 In the case of a corruptible auctioneer, all auctioneer profit translates into lost seller profit. This is consistent with previous findings in the corruption literature, e.g. Menezes and Monteiro (2005) and Burguet and Che (2004) .
Remark 2. An incentive-compatible mechanism that allocates the object to the highest value buyer always results in a seller's payoff equal to the revenues from an efficient auction minus the sum of cheating costs incurred by all players.
The rest of this section illustrates this basic result through two applications. Section 2.1 considers a seller who announces a first-price auction with zero reserve price, but is unable to keep bids secret and unable to refuse to consider late offers. This gives buyers the incentive to "spy" on one another. Section 2.2 considers a seller who announces a second-price auction with zero reserve price, but is unable to commit not to hire a shill bidder.
In each of these applications, the seller's expected equilibrium profit can be substantially lower than if she could have committed to the announced rules, with losses on the same order of magnitude as the gain from committing to an optimal reserve price. 
Spying in the first-price auction
In this section, we consider a seller who announces a first-price auction with zero reserve price, but can not stop buyers from "spying".
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Model. In period 0, each bidder learns his private value v i , where
Our "first-price auction with spying" model differs from the "first-price auction with corruption" models studied by Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2002) , Menezes and Monteiro (2005) , and others. One difference is that, in our model, bidders' costs to learn others' values are socially wasteful rather than a transfer.
1, each bidder simultaneously decides whether to submit his final bid b i,1 or pay c ≥ 0 to spy. In period 2, all those who decided to spy learn all bids made by those who did not spy.
(Spying can be interpreted as attempting to discover others' bids as well as making sure that one's own bid can not be discovered.) In period 3, all those who decided to spy then submit their final offers b i,3 . (Each bidder submits a bid in either period 1 or period 3.) The highest bidder pays his bid and receives the object. Any bid submitted in period 3 wins in a tie over any bid submitted in period 1, whereas ties between bids submitted in the same period are broken by coin-flip.
We shall restrict attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria in which each bidder chooses to spy iff his private value v i > v * for some threshold v * ∈ [0, 1] ("threshold equilibria").
Theorem 2 establishes that there is a unique threshold equilibrium. 
We conjecture but have not proven that this is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 13 A bidder having the threshold value v * (N, c) wins in equilibrium iff he has the highest value, whether he chooses to spy or not to spy. (See the proof in the Appendix.) (N, c) )
So, bidder i is indifferent between spying and not spying given value v * (N, c) .
If the cost of spying is zero, the first-price auction with spying becomes equivalent to a true first-price auction (with zero reserve price). Each bidder waits until period 3 before making his bid, but such delay is costless. At the same time, if the cost of spying is sufficiently
N 2 ), every bidder submits his bid in period 1 and the game is again equivalent to a true first-price auction. Spying hurts the seller in our model the most when the cost of spying is small enough that bidders sometimes choose to spy but large enough that the expected losses due to spying are not inconsequential. (By assumption, each bidder has only one opportunity to spy, so the total expected losses due to spying are bounded by N c.)
Special case. Suppose that N = 2 and c = 1/9. v * (N, c) = 2/3 in the unique threshold equilibrium. Each bidder spies with probability 1/3, so total expected spying costs are 2/27.
In this setting, a first-price auction with zero reserve price raises expected revenue 1/3. Since the first-price auction with spying also allocates the object to the buyer with the highest value in equilibrium, Theorem 1 (Remark 2) implies that the seller's expected revenue must be 1/3 − 2/27 ≈ .259, about 22% less than the expected revenue in a standard efficient auction.
In related work, McAdams and Schwarz (2006) studies costly cheating in the first-price auction, but considers the possibility that the seller may cheat, soliciting additional rounds of offers although this leads to costly delay. As long as the per-round cost of delay is large enough, the seller can credibly commit to a first-price auction. However, unlike in the present study of spying, the total cost of cheating does not disappear as the cost of each cheating episode goes to zero. Indeed, as the delay between rounds of offers falls, the seller asks for so many more rounds that total delay may actually increase.
Also related is Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2006)'s analysis of the "generalized first-price auction" that was used in the early days of Internet advertisement. 14 In such auctions a bidder can gain a significant advantage by investing in robots that are faster than others' robots; this in turn can be detrimental for auctions' revenues. Intuitively, each bidder who invests in a fast robot is able to choose his bid after observing the bids made by those with a slow robot. This is similar to spying in our model, in which each bidder who spies is able to choose his bid after observing the bids made by those who did not spy.
Second-price auction with shill bidding
Second-price auctions are vulnerable to different sorts of cheating than first-price auctions.
In this section, we consider an example in which the seller announces a second-price auction with zero reserve price, but may hire a shill bidder. In the unique equilibrium, buyers shade their bids below their values in anticipation that the seller will sometimes hire a shill, and expected (gross) revenue is the same as if shills were impossible to hire. Thus, all resources spent hiring shills translate into lost seller profit.
Model. In period 0, each bidder learns his private value v i , where v i ∼ U [0, 1] iid, and the seller decides whether to (unobservably) hire a shill at cost w > 0. 15 The seller knows w, 14 In the generalized first-price auction, advertisers submit bids per click and their sponsored links are arranged on the web page in order of their bids. Thus, higher bidders get more visible positions on the page that yield more clicks, but each advertiser pays his bid per click regardless of the position that he gets. 15 A very similar analysis applies to an alternative game in which the seller decides whether to pay the cost w > 0 after observing the bids. In equilibrium in this case, buyers correctly anticipate that the winner will pay his own bid whenever the (ex post) difference between the highest and second-highest bids exceeds while the buyers only know its atomless c.d.f. F w (·). in period 1, each bidder submits a bid and the winner is the highest bidder, with ties broken by coin-flip. If the seller has not hired a shill, the winner pays the second-highest bid. If the seller has hired a shill, on the other hand, the winner pays his own bid. (Without shill bidding, the winner pays the second-highest bid which is less than or equal to than the highest bid. With shill bidding, the second-highest bid is always equal to the highest bid.)
Theorem 3. The second-price auction with shill bidding has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The seller hires a shill whenever w <
, where p * is the unique solution of (3) below. Buyers then follow the symmetric bidding strategy b(
Proof. Consider first the bidding subgame. Buyers care about the probability p that the seller employs a shill. Taking this probability as given, the resulting game amongst the buyers is strategically equivalent to one of the "exotic auctions" considered in Lizzeri and 
The unique solution to (2) 
. Next, consider the seller's initial decision regarding whether to hire a shill. The seller cares about how much shill bidding will increase w, and shade their bids accordingly.
her expected revenues. If bidders believe that the seller will hire a shill with probability p, this increased revenue equals
where 2nd max i b(v i ; p) denotes the second-highest bid. Thus, the seller will hire a shill
. In equilibrium, buyers correctly anticipate the use of shills, so the probability p = p * where p * is defined as follows:
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary. The seller's expected profit in the second-price auction with shill bidding is
less than in a second-price auction without shill bidding.
Numerical example. Suppose that N = 2 and that the cost of hiring a shill w ∼ U [1/9, 1/3]. It is easy to check that p * = 1/2 and that the seller hires a shill whenever w < 1 3(1+1/2) = 2/9. The seller spends c s = 1/12 on shills on average, whereas the winner's expected payment is 1/3. Since the second-price auction with shill bidding allocates the object to the buyer with the highest value in equilibrium, Theorem 1 (Remark 2) implies that the seller's expected revenue is only 1/4, compared to expected revenue 1/3 in a second-price auction with zero reserve price and no shill bidding. Note that, relative to a second-price 16 The left-hand-side of (3) auction with zero reserve price, the seller's expected loss due to shill bidding here is as large as the expected gain from committing to an optimal reserve price. (Expected revenue in a second-price auction with optimal reserve price is 5/12 = 1/3 + 1/12.)
Now suppose that the seller can take some (observable) action that increases the cost of hiring a shill by 1/6. Given shill cost w ∼ U [1/3, 5/9], it is easy to check that the seller never hires a shill bidder (p * = 0) and her expected profit increases to 1/3. Thus, the seller is willing to pay up to 1/12 (25% of expected revenue) to increase her cost of hiring a shill.
However, raising the cost of using shills may be difficult. 17 For example, a seller may not be able to credibly impose a fine for withdrawing a winning bid (a standard ploy of shill bidders), since for a shill bid this fine would simply "travel from the seller's left pocket to her right pocket".
On the other hand, a sufficiently reputable third-party may be able to credibly deter the seller from employing shills. By investigating buyers' credentials and/or forcing buyers to post a bond, such an intermediary can raise the cost of employing a shill. By not allowing bid withdrawal and by charging a commission, similarly, the intermediary can make it more costly for the seller to have a shill "win".
Interestingly, not all intermediaries have taken such steps. In contrast to traditional auction houses such as Sotheby's, online auctioneer eBay charges low commissions and makes it relatively easy to withdraw bids. According to eBay rules, a buyer can withdraw a bid if there is a "clear typo" such as bidding $1200 instead of $120. An unscrupulous seller can therefore use a shill who purposefully submits a high bid with a typo and then withdraws 17 Committing always to use shills is easy, since this is equivalent to making the winner pay his own bid.
However, as we have seen, the first-price auction may be vulnerable to other sorts of cheating. Also, beyond the scope of our model in asymmetric environments, the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction may be less than in a second-price auction (Maskin and Riley (2000) ).
it. eBay rules are explicit on this matter, suggesting that it is more than a theoretical possibility: "Manipulating bids to discover the maximum bid of the current high bidder, and then retracting the bid, is prohibited". 18 Yet, detecting that a seller has violated this eBay rule may be difficult. Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990) discuss why buyers will be reluctant to bid their true values in a Vickrey auction, if they fear that the seller may insert a shill bid. Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) examine a common-value setting with costless shill bidding, and show that the seller is worse off having the option to sometimes use a shill bidder. The underlying logic of their result is very different from ours. In Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) , an effect related to the "winner's curse" depresses expected revenue. By contrast, we consider a private-value setting with costly shill bidding, where there is no winner's curse.
3 Can an auctioneer change the game?
An incorruptible auctioneer who is able to both detect and punish cheating can help the seller to increase her expected revenue by conducting a clean auction. In what settings can we expect such intermediaries to arise?
Incorruptibility is necessary so that the auctioneer does not cheat on behalf of any of the other players. The auctioneer may not be able sign formal contracts promising not to cheat, especially if cheating is difficult to verify in court. If so, to be incorruptible, the auctioneer must have a profitable repeat business or be able to link his reputation in other markets to his performance as an auctioneer. Network effects, economies of scale, and switching costs may all make it difficult to enter the auctioneering market, and thereby allow auctioneers to sustain positive economic profit. There must also be some chance that auctioneer cheating will be detected by the buyers and sellers with whom the auctioneer will interact in the future. Once auctioneer cheating is detected, sellers can credibly commit to punish the auctioneer by refusing to pay as much for its services, since they expect lower revenue when hiring a corrupt auctioneer.
At the same time, the auctioneer must be able to deter buyers and sellers from cheating on their own. Such deterrence requires the threat of sanctions in future interactions, which in turn requires that cheating players not be able to switch too easily in the future to another auctioneer who is not aware of the cheater's past. For this reason, deterrence requires either that switching costs be relatively high, or that the auctioneering market be relatively concentrated, or that auctioneers be able to share information about cheaters. (A similar analysis of the shill bidding example is omitted to save space.) Spying may or may not require the auctioneer's cooperation but, again to save space, we will focus on the case in which it does. The auctioneer can eliminate spying by resisting the temptation to accept a bribe from any buyer. Each bidder i's willingness to bribe the auctioneer is greatest when he has value v i = 1. Assuming that the auctioneer can not be bribed, so that the other bidder acts as if in a first-price auction, a bidder with value v i = 1 would pay an average price of 1/4 after spying, rather than his equilibrium bid of 1/2. Suppose that the auctioneer makes profit π A per sale and has discount factor δ A between sales, and that there is a probability p A ∈ [0, 1] that accepting a bribe today will lead it to lose all future business. In present value terms, the auctioneer's at-risk reputation is p A π A δ A 1−δ A . Since the cost of spying is 1/9, a buyer with value v i = 1 will be able to bribe the auctioneer unless
Concluding Remarks
Committing to a mechanism is difficult for a seller, especially when she has an ex post incentive to change the rules of the game or allow buyers to break the rules of the game. As long as buyers are sophisticated, however, the seller is better off committing to a mechanism with hard rules in which neither the seller nor any buyer has the ability and incentive to break the rules. Furthermore, the lost revenue due to the seller's inability to enforce rules can be substantial, on the same order of magnitude as the extra revenue from an optimal reserve price.
When a seller would otherwise lose substantial expected revenue due to cheating, institutions may arise to help sellers enforce mechanism rules and hence avoid wasteful spending on cheating. Professional auctioneers who help conduct orderly sales are an example. Such intermediaries can more easily commit to hard rules than a seller if they interact repeatedly with buyers and sellers and stand to lose a valuable reputation by not punishing rule-breakers.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. By the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, each bidder's interim expected surplus given value v i must be v 0 p i (x)dx given any incentive-compatible mechanism with allocation p(·). Since buyer surplus depends only on the probability of winning p i (v i ) and the net payment
Total expected surplus gross of cheating costs in either mechanism is
Since seller profit equal total gross surplus minus buyer surplus,
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is in four steps. First, in any threshold equilibrium, those who bid in the first period and those who spy / bid in the third period must bid as if in a first-price auction. Second, there is only one threshold level v * (N, c) consistent with (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. Third, the strategies corresponding to this threshold constitute an equilibrium. Fourth, on the seller's expected revenue in this equilibrium.
Step 1 
Thus, bidder i is certain to lose if any other bidder has value greater than v * , since any such bidder will spy and then outbid bidder i. We may therefore express bidder i's optimization problem as 
when #(I) > 1 and b i,3 (v i ; 1) = max j =i b j,1 when I = {i}.
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Step 2. Any bidder having the threshold type v i = v * must be indifferent between bidding in period 1 and spying. As argued above, if a bidder with value v * were to bid in period 1, his best bid would be
. If he spies, on the other hand, a bidder with the threshold type only pays
2 when he wins. 20 Thus, the expected gain from spying is Pr max
for the threshold type. Since the cost of spying is c ≥ 0, the threshold type must be
Step 3. Do the threshold strategies corresponding to threshold v * (N, c) constitute an equilibrium? In Step 1, we established the (unique) equilibrium bidding strategies for those who do not spy, in period 1, and for those who do spy, in period 3. Now we need to check that bidder i prefers to spy iff v i ≥ v * (N, c). If v i < v * (N, c), the gain from spying is strictly less than (5). By definition of v * (N, c), bidder i therefore prefers not to spy. Finally, suppose that v i ≥ v * (N, c). We prove that bidder i prefers to spy in this case, in a few smaller steps. 
